Liu Fang, Liang Chen
Economic School of Changzhou University, China.
Financial Technology School of Shenzhen University, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 30;10(19):e38748. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e38748. eCollection 2024 Oct 15.
This study examines the link between genuine earnings management and management's integrity commitment using data from A-share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (2007-2021). Findings indicate that following genuine earnings management, management tends to emphasize integrity in the MD&A section of annual reports, suggesting moral camouflage in response to negative moral emotions. This behavior is more pronounced with higher information asymmetry between management and investors, amplifying the tendency towards moral camouflage. Further analysis shows that post-earnings management, there is no significant increase in charitable contributions or CSR performance, and agency costs remain high, underscoring a preference for moral camouflage over moral purity. Additionally, management's integrity commitment does not affect analysts' future market valuations or reduce the likelihood of regulatory inquiries. The study also finds that the relationship between earnings management and integrity commitment strengthens under increased moral pressure. This research provides theoretical insights into executive behavior driven by negative moral emotions and offers practical implications for investors, auditors, and regulators.
本研究利用沪深证券交易所A股上市公司（2007 - 2021年）的数据，考察了真实盈余管理与管理层诚信承诺之间的联系。研究结果表明，在进行真实盈余管理之后，管理层倾向于在年报的管理层讨论与分析部分强调诚信，这表明其为应对负面道德情绪而进行道德伪装。这种行为在管理层与投资者之间信息不对称程度较高时更为明显，加剧了道德伪装的倾向。进一步分析表明，盈余管理后，慈善捐赠或企业社会责任表现没有显著增加，代理成本仍然很高，这凸显了对道德伪装而非道德纯粹性的偏好。此外，管理层的诚信承诺并不会影响分析师对未来的市场估值，也不会降低受到监管问询的可能性。研究还发现，在道德压力增加的情况下，盈余管理与诚信承诺之间的关系会加强。本研究为负面道德情绪驱动的高管行为提供了理论见解，并为投资者、审计师和监管机构提供了实际启示。
