Puggioni Raffaela
Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, 131001, India.
Open Res Eur. 2024 Oct 7;4:2. doi: 10.12688/openreseurope.16686.2. eCollection 2024.
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected virtually all daily activities, relations and practices. People were expected to act responsibly by following social distancing, masking, sanitation and stay-home rules. The prevailing ethos of the time was that to protect others, one must first protect oneself. By examining the creative modalities through which (a few) people in Paris circumvented mobility restrictions to help and support those in need, this article investigates the relation between (im)mobility and (ir)responsibility. Is mobility, during a time of forced immobility, an irresponsible act? What does it mean to act responsibly during a life-threatening emergency? Does responsibility always require complete and unequivocal compliance with extant norms, or should responsibility be evaluated in light of the motives that inspire (unauthorised) mobility? The issue of (ir)responsible (im)mobility is scrutinised here by drawing upon the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. While the former furthers our understanding of ethical relations, the latter makes us rethink the concept of response-ability and, in particular, the aporia this concept entails. As Derrida highlights, truly ethical acts are impossible for the very reason that all ethical acts are, at the very same time, responsible towards some and irresponsible towards others.
新冠疫情几乎影响了所有日常活动、人际关系和行为习惯。人们被期望通过遵守社交距离、佩戴口罩、保持卫生和居家规定来履行责任。当时盛行的观念是，为了保护他人，必须首先保护好自己。通过审视巴黎的（少数）人规避行动限制以帮助和支持有需要之人的创造性方式，本文探讨了（不）行动与（不）责任之间的关系。在强制静止的时期，行动是否是一种不负责任的行为？在危及生命的紧急情况下，负责任地行动意味着什么？责任是否总是要求完全且明确地遵守现有规范，还是应该根据激发（未经授权的）行动的动机来评估责任？本文借助埃马纽埃尔·列维纳斯和雅克·德里达的著作，审视了（不）负责任的（不）行动问题。前者增进了我们对伦理关系的理解，而后者促使我们重新思考责任能力的概念，尤其是这一概念所带来的困境。正如德里达所强调的，真正的伦理行为是不可能的，原因恰恰在于所有伦理行为同时对一些人负责而对另一些人不负责任。
