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政治从业者很难准确预测哪些信息能说服公众。

Political practitioners poorly predict which messages persuade the public.

机构信息

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511.

出版信息

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2024 Nov 5;121(45):e2400076121. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2400076121. Epub 2024 Oct 28.

Abstract

Do political practitioners have good intuitions about how to persuade the public? Longstanding theories that political elites' messages have large effects on public opinion and the large sums spent to secure some practitioners' messaging advice suggest they should. However, findings regarding the surprising limits of expert forecasts in other domains suggest they may not. In this paper, we evaluate how well political practitioners can predict which messages are most persuasive. We measured the effects of [Formula: see text] messages about 21 political issues using a large-sample survey experiment ([Formula: see text] respondent-message observations). We then asked both political practitioners ([Formula: see text] practitioners, [Formula: see text] predictions) and laypeople ([Formula: see text] respondents, [Formula: see text] predictions) to predict the efficacy of these messages. The practitioners we surveyed ranged widely in their experience and expertise with persuasive message design. We find that: (a) political practitioners and laypeople both performed barely better than chance at predicting persuasive effects; (b) once accounting for laypeople's inflated expectations about the average size of effects, practitioners did not predict meaningfully better than laypeople; (c) these results held even for self-identified issue experts and highly experienced practitioners; and (d) practitioners' experience, expertise, information environment, and demographics did not meaningfully explain variation in their accuracy. Our findings have theoretical implications for understanding the conditions likely to produce meaningful elite influence on public opinion as well as practical implications for practitioners.

摘要

政治从业者是否对如何说服公众有良好的直觉?长期以来的理论认为,政治精英的信息对公众舆论有很大的影响,而且为了确保一些从业者的信息建议,花费了大量资金,这表明他们应该有良好的直觉。然而,在其他领域,关于专家预测令人惊讶的局限性的发现表明,他们可能没有。在本文中,我们评估了政治从业者能够在多大程度上预测哪些信息最有说服力。我们使用大规模样本调查实验([Formula: see text] 名受访者-信息观察)来衡量关于 21 个政治问题的[Formula: see text]信息的效果。然后,我们请政治从业者([Formula: see text] 名从业者,[Formula: see text] 个预测)和外行人([Formula: see text] 名受访者,[Formula: see text] 个预测)来预测这些信息的效果。我们调查的从业者在有说服力的信息设计方面的经验和专业知识差异很大。我们发现:(a)政治从业者和外行人在预测说服力效果方面都表现得几乎不比随机猜测好;(b)一旦考虑到外行人对平均效应大小的过高预期,从业者的预测就不会比外行人有意义地更好;(c)即使对于自我认定的问题专家和经验丰富的从业者,这些结果也成立;(d)从业者的经验、专业知识、信息环境和人口统计学特征并不能显著解释他们准确性的差异。我们的研究结果对理解可能产生有意义的精英对公众舆论影响的条件具有理论意义,对从业者也具有实际意义。

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