Siffels Lotje E, Sharon Tamar
Interdisciplinary Research Hub On Digitalization and Society (iHub), Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Department of Philosophical Ethics and Political Philosophy, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Philos Technol. 2024;37(4):125. doi: 10.1007/s13347-024-00807-y. Epub 2024 Oct 28.
In April 2020, in the midst of its first pandemic lockdown, the Dutch government announced plans to develop a contact tracing app to help contain the spread of the coronavirus - the Originally intended to address the problem of the overburdening of manual contract tracers, by the time the app was released six months later, the problem it sought to solve had drastically changed, without the solution undergoing any modification, making it a prime example of technosolutionism. While numerous critics have mobilised the concept of technosolutionism, the questions of how technosolutionism works in practice and which specific harms it can provoke have been understudied. In this paper we advance a thick conception of technosolutionism which, drawing on Evgeny Morozov, distinguishes it from the notion of technological fix, and, drawing on constructivism, emphasizes its constructivist dimension. Using this concept, we closely follow the problem that the Coronamelder aimed to solve and how it shifted over time to fit the Coronamelder solution, rather than the other way around. We argue that, although problems are always constructed, technosolutionist problems are constructed, insofar as the careful and cautious deliberation which should accompany problem construction in public policy is absent in the case of technosolutionism. This can lead to three harms: a subversion of democratic decision-making; the presence of powerful new actors in the public policy context - here Big Tech; and the creation of "orphan problems", whereby the initial problems that triggered the need to develop a (techno)solution are left behind. We question whether the most popular form of technology ethics today, which focuses predominantly on the of technology, is well-equipped to address these technosolutionist harms, insofar as such a focus may preclude critical thinking about whether or not technology should be the solution in the first place.
2020年4月,在首次疫情封锁期间,荷兰政府宣布计划开发一款接触者追踪应用程序,以帮助遏制冠状病毒的传播。最初旨在解决人工接触者追踪负担过重的问题,但在六个月后该应用程序发布时,它试图解决的问题已发生了巨大变化,而解决方案却未作任何修改,这使其成为技术解决主义的典型例子。尽管众多批评者运用了技术解决主义的概念,但技术解决主义在实践中如何运作以及可能引发哪些具体危害的问题却鲜有研究。在本文中,我们提出了一个关于技术解决主义的全面概念,借鉴叶夫根尼·莫罗佐夫的观点,将其与技术修复的概念区分开来,并借鉴建构主义,强调其建构主义维度。运用这一概念,我们密切关注“新冠追踪者”(Coronamelder)旨在解决的问题以及该问题如何随时间推移而变化以适应“新冠追踪者”解决方案,而不是相反。我们认为,尽管问题总是被建构出来的,但技术解决主义的问题是被建构的,因为在技术解决主义的情况下,公共政策中本应伴随问题建构的审慎思考并不存在。这可能导致三种危害:对民主决策的颠覆;公共政策背景中出现强大的新行为体——此处指大型科技公司;以及产生“孤儿问题”,即引发开发(技术)解决方案需求的初始问题被抛在脑后。我们质疑当今最流行的技术伦理形式,即主要关注技术的影响,是否有能力应对这些技术解决主义的危害,因为这种关注可能会排除对技术是否首先应成为解决方案的批判性思考。