Sambaraju Rahul
Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.
Br J Soc Psychol. 2025 Jan;64(1):e12846. doi: 10.1111/bjso.12846.
Social psychological research on race and racism has shown that claims about racism are not always accepted or received as valid reports. In this paper, I offer racial epistemics as one mechanism by which race-talk takes place. I examine how ascribing category-bound entitlements to experiential or other knowledge about racism is variously realised and complicated in the production of claims about racism. Through examining news media accounts where Black persons were invited to talk about their experiences of racism in India, I show that despite ascribing a privileged epistemic position to Black persons, recipients (interviewers and other panellists) could make salient epistemic entitlements to commonsense, specialised, or other forms of (racial) knowledge in collaboratively establishing, confirming or correcting, and challenging claims about racism in India. The findings are discussed in relation to the broader understanding of racism in social psychology. The data are in Indian English.
关于种族与种族主义的社会心理学研究表明，有关种族主义的说法并不总是被当作有效的报告而被接受或认可。在本文中，我提出种族认识论是种族话语得以发生的一种机制。我考察了在有关种族主义的说法的产生过程中，将特定类别的权利赋予关于种族主义的经验性知识或其他知识是如何以各种方式实现并变得复杂的。通过审视邀请黑人谈论他们在印度的种族主义经历的新闻媒体报道，我发现尽管赋予了黑人一种特权认知地位，但接受者（采访者和其他小组成员）在共同确立、确认或纠正以及质疑有关印度种族主义的说法时，可能会凸显对常识、专业知识或其他形式（种族）知识的认知权利。研究结果将结合社会心理学中对种族主义的更广泛理解进行讨论。数据采用印度英语。
