Campbell Andrea Louise, Morgan Kimberly J
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
George Washington University.
J Health Polit Policy Law. 2025 Aug 1;50(4):629-657. doi: 10.1215/03616878-11825370.
The Delegated Welfare State (Morgan and Campbell 2011) explored the causes and possible consequences of the 2003 Medicare reform boosting private managed care plans in the delivery of Medicare benefits. In this article, the authors review scholarship on beneficiary experience (access, costs, outcomes) and political feedbacks arising from the delegated governance reform to evaluate whether predictions about consumer behavior and policy entrenchment have come true. They find that beneficiary experiences and satisfaction do not differ significantly between Medicare Advantage (MA) and traditional Medicare, and MA plans' managed care techniques have cut per-beneficiary spending. But MA remains costlier to the federal government per beneficiary because of the outsized payments received by plan providers. Officials have failed to rectify these overpayments because of policy feedback effects, that is, the empowerment of lobbying groups with a stake in the program and beneficiary support for it. Growing dependence on private plans to deliver health insurance for senior citizens, a large and politically influential constituency, has rendered government officials and elected politicians reluctant to imperil this market and the happiness of beneficiaries.
《委托福利国家》(摩根和坎贝尔,2011年)探讨了2003年医疗保险改革在提供医疗保险福利方面推动私人管理式医疗计划的原因及可能产生的后果。在本文中,作者回顾了关于受益人的体验(获取、成本、结果)以及委托治理改革引发的政治反馈的学术研究,以评估对消费者行为和政策固化的预测是否成真。他们发现,医疗保险优势计划(MA)和传统医疗保险在受益人的体验和满意度方面并无显著差异,而且MA计划的管理式医疗技术降低了每位受益人的支出。但由于计划供应商获得的巨额付款,MA对联邦政府而言每位受益人的成本仍然更高。由于政策反馈效应,即与该计划有利害关系的游说团体的权力以及受益人对它的支持,官员们未能纠正这些超额付款。对私人计划在为老年人(一个庞大且具有政治影响力的选民群体)提供医疗保险方面的依赖日益增加,使得政府官员和当选政治家不愿危及这个市场和受益人的满意度。