Zhao Hailing, Wang Weiqing, Li Xiaozhu
Engineering Research Center of Ministry of Education for Renewable Energy Generation and Grid Connection Technology, Xinjiang University, Ürümqi, 830047, Xinjiang, China.
Sci Rep. 2025 Mar 14;15(1):8882. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-93232-w.
This paper propose a Nash Stackelberg game based trading decision model of joint power market contain frequency/regulation/reserve for day ahead transaction to deal with the challenges brought by the insufficient peak shaving and frequency regulation capacity of a high proportion of renewable energy. This model utilizes Copula-CVaR to quantify the risk of revenue loss caused by the uncertainty of power generation and consumption. The model based double layer game of Nash Stackelberg and considering the total cost of regulation and the profits of multiple types of independent operating entities. So the proposed model is complex with the traditional model because it is not only requires the balance between the upper and lower level entities, but also requires the balance between multiple types of power supplies in the lower level. The rationality and effectiveness of the trading decision model is verified by the measured data of the renewable energy gathering area in northwest China. The calculation results indicate that the trading strategy not only breaks through the limitations of poor flexibility in the power market caused by insufficient grid synchronization machines, but also solves the development bottleneck of long investment payback period and low utilization rate of energy storage stations.
本文提出了一种基于纳什-斯塔克尔伯格博弈的日前交易联合电力市场（包含频率/调节/备用）交易决策模型，以应对高比例可再生能源带来的调峰和调频能力不足所带来的挑战。该模型利用Copula-CVaR量化发电和用电不确定性导致的收益损失风险。该模型基于纳什-斯塔克尔伯格双层博弈，考虑了调节总成本和多种类型独立运营实体的利润。因此，所提出的模型与传统模型相比更为复杂，因为它不仅要求上层和下层实体之间保持平衡，还要求下层多种电源之间保持平衡。通过中国西北可再生能源集聚区的实测数据验证了交易决策模型的合理性和有效性。计算结果表明，该交易策略不仅突破了电网同步机不足导致电力市场灵活性差的局限，还解决了储能电站投资回收期长、利用率低的发展瓶颈。
