Zucchelli Micaela Maria, Matteucci Armandi Avogli Trotti Nicola, Pavan Andrea, Piccardi Laura, Nori Raffaella
Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy.
Department of Psychology, "Sapienza" University of Rome, Rome, Italy.
Front Psychol. 2025 Mar 7;16:1451590. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1451590. eCollection 2025.
The classic Dual Process model posits that decision-making is determined by the interplay of an intuitive System 1 and a logical System 2. In contrast, the revised model suggests that intuition can also be logical. The Cognitive load paradigm has been used to distinguish underlying rational and intuitive processes, as it tends to lead to the use of heuristics over reasoning. Through two studies, we aimed to investigate the impact of two increasing levels of extraneous cognitive load on intentionality decision-making by comparing the two decision-making models.
The task required participants to attribute intentionality to negative and positive side effects, which were foreseeable but not deliberately intended. This compared an intuitive response, focused on the outcome, with a logical one, focused on the absence of intention. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions, each with varying cognitive loads (high cognitive load vs. low cognitive load vs. no cognitive load) and scenario valence (negative vs. positive). In Study 1, cognitive load was made by introducing a concurrent task during intentionality attribution, whereas in Study 2, cognitive load was accomplished by associating the dual-task with a time pressure paradigm. Participants under cognitive load were expected to exhibit cognitive resource exhaustion, providing greater judgments of intentionality for negative outcomes and lower for positive ones, due to the dominance of intuition, compared to evaluations provided by participants who were not under cognitive load.
In both studies, cognitive load reduced intentionality attributions for positive side effects compared to the no-load condition, with response times being longer for positive side effects than for negative ones.
This pattern suggests System 2 intervention for positive outcomes and System 1 dominance for negative ones. Therefore, introducing cognitive load enabled us to identify the different roles of the two decision systems in intentionality attribution.
经典的双加工模型认为，决策是由直觉性的系统1和逻辑性的系统2相互作用决定的。相比之下，修订后的模型表明直觉也可以是逻辑性的。认知负荷范式已被用于区分潜在的理性和直觉过程，因为它往往会导致使用启发式而非推理。通过两项研究，我们旨在通过比较两种决策模型，研究两种不断增加的额外认知负荷水平对意向性决策的影响。
该任务要求参与者将意向性归因于可预见但非故意造成的负面和正面副作用。这将专注于结果的直觉反应与专注于无意向性的逻辑反应进行了比较。参与者被随机分配到六个实验条件之一，每个条件具有不同的认知负荷（高认知负荷与低认知负荷与无认知负荷）和情景效价（负面与正面）。在研究1中，通过在意向性归因过程中引入并发任务来产生认知负荷，而在研究2中，通过将双任务与时间压力范式相关联来实现认知负荷。预计处于认知负荷下的参与者会表现出认知资源耗尽，由于直觉的主导作用，与未处于认知负荷下的参与者的评估相比，对负面结果的意向性判断更高，对正面结果的意向性判断更低。
在两项研究中，与无负荷条件相比，认知负荷降低了对正面副作用的意向性归因，正面副作用的反应时间比负面副作用更长。
这种模式表明系统2对正面结果进行干预，系统1对负面结果占主导地位。因此，引入认知负荷使我们能够确定两个决策系统在意向性归因中的不同作用。
