Cova Florian, Lantian Anthony, Boudesseul Jordane
University of Geneva, Switzerland
University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2016 Oct;42(10):1295-308. doi: 10.1177/0146167216656356. Epub 2016 Jul 15.
Based on the "Knobe Effect," Knobe has argued that moral evaluations can influence intentionality judgments. However, two methodological objections have been raised against this claim: first, that participants' answers do not accurately reflect what they think and, second, that the Knobe Effect can be fully explained by non-moral factors, such as the agent's desires or beliefs. In this article, we discuss these two methodological objections to the existence of the Knobe Effect and provide new evidence that moral evaluations can shape intentionality judgments. First, Study 1 shows that standard measures of intentionality do not overestimate participants' intentionality judgments. Second, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that participants' moral evaluations still mediate the impact of positive versus negative side-effects on judgments about intentional action, even when taking into account a whole range of non-moral factors. Results suggest that moral evaluations play an irreducible role in shaping our judgments about intentional action.
基于“诺布效应”,诺布认为道德评价会影响意向性判断。然而,针对这一观点出现了两个方法论上的反对意见:其一,参与者的回答并不能准确反映他们的想法;其二,诺布效应可以完全由非道德因素来解释,比如行为者的欲望或信念。在本文中,我们讨论了这两个对诺布效应存在性的方法论上的反对意见,并提供了新的证据表明道德评价能够塑造意向性判断。首先,研究1表明,意向性的标准测量方法并没有高估参与者的意向性判断。其次,研究2和研究3表明,即使考虑到一系列非道德因素,参与者的道德评价仍然在积极与消极副作用对故意行为判断的影响中起中介作用。结果表明,道德评价在塑造我们对故意行为的判断中起着不可削减的作用。