Hejlesen Jonas Tellefsen
Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark.
Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2025 Mar 31;59(2):38. doi: 10.1007/s12124-025-09905-8.
In this paper, I present a crude, provisional theory of moral condemnation based on a discursive analysis of an interaction between two prominent political figures - on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) - in the aftermath of the Iranian missile strike on Israel on 1 October 2024. Based on the analysis, I argue that moral condemnations may serve as a tool for regulating action, and I provide a game-based analogy which may help encapsule two central aspects of moral condemnation: the construction of moral responsibility and a relationship of guilt (setting the board); and the (attempt to) regulate action (playing the game). Finally, I propose that we may also use moral condemnations as a substitute for action - especially in instances where the actor is either unable or unwilling to intervene. By morally condemning we may create a socially and/or personally legitimate excuse for inaction through a displacement of the responsibility to act - thus, ultimately allowing oneself to not do anything by not doing nothing.
在本文中,我基于对2024年10月1日伊朗对以色列发动导弹袭击后,两位知名政治人物在社交媒体平台X(前身为推特)上的互动进行话语分析,提出了一个粗糙的、临时的道德谴责理论。基于该分析,我认为道德谴责可能是一种行为规范工具,并提供了一个基于博弈的类比,它可能有助于概括道德谴责的两个核心方面:道德责任的建构以及罪责关系(设定棋盘);以及(尝试)规范行为(进行博弈)。最后,我提出我们也可以将道德谴责用作行动的替代——尤其是在行为者无法或不愿干预的情况下。通过进行道德谴责,我们可以通过将行动责任转移,为不作为创造一个社会和/或个人层面上合理的借口——从而,最终通过什么都不做来让自己不必采取任何行动。