J Appl Psychol. 2025 May;110(5):722. doi: 10.1037/apl0001275.
Reports an error in "The dynamics of gender and alternatives in negotiation" by Jennifer E. Dannals, Julian J. Zlatev, Nir Halevy and Margaret A. Neale (, 2021[Nov], Vol 106[11], 1655-1672). In the article, "† p < .10" and "*** p < .001" were removed from the notes for Tables 3, 4, and 5. In Table 6, five values in the "Total dyads" column and three values in the "% Impasses" column were corrected in the male-female and male-male gender composition categories. In the first paragraph of the "Results and Discussion" section for Study 2, the and values for differences in aspirations set by gender were corrected from = -0.10, = 0.29, to = -0.03, = 0.10. These corrections did not alter any of the article's conclusions. The online version of this article has been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2021-03654-001.) A substantial body of prior research documents a gender gap in negotiation performance. Competing accounts suggest that the gap is due either to women's stereotype-congruent behavior in negotiations or to backlash enacted toward women for stereotype-incongruent behavior. In this article, we use a novel data set of over 2,500 individual negotiators to examine how negotiation performance varies as a function of gender and the strength of one's alternative to a negotiated agreement. We find that the gender gap in negotiation outcomes exists only when female negotiators have a strong outside option. Furthermore, our large data set allows us to examine an understudied performance outcome, rate of impasse. We find that negotiations in which at least one negotiator is a woman with a strong alternative disproportionately end in impasse, a performance outcome that leaves considerable potential value unallocated. In addition, we find that these gender differences in negotiation performance are not due to gender differences in aspirations, reservation values, or first offers. Overall, these findings are consistent with a backlash account, whereby counterparts are less likely to come to an agreement and therefore reach a potentially worse outcome when one party is a female negotiator empowered by a strong alternative. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
报告了詹妮弗·E·丹纳尔斯、朱利安·J·兹拉泰夫、尼尔·哈勒维和玛格丽特·A·尼尔所著的《谈判中的性别动态与替代方案》（2021年11月，第106卷第11期，1655 - 1672页）中的一处错误。在该文章中，表3、表4和表5的注释中删除了“† p <.10”和“*** p <.001”。在表6中，对男女和男男性别构成类别中“总二元组”列的五个值和“僵局百分比”列的三个值进行了修正。在研究2的“结果与讨论”部分的第一段中，按性别设定的期望差异的 和 值从 = -0.10， = 0.29修正为 = -0.03， = 0.10。这些修正未改变文章的任何结论。本文的网络版本已作修正。（原始文章的以下摘要出现在记录2021 - 03654 - 001中。）大量先前的研究记录了谈判表现中的性别差距。相互竞争的观点表明，这种差距要么是由于女性在谈判中表现出符合刻板印象的行为，要么是由于女性因不符合刻板印象的行为而受到的反弹。在本文中，我们使用一个包含2500多名个体谈判者的新颖数据集，来研究谈判表现如何随性别以及一个人对谈判协议的替代方案的强度而变化。我们发现，只有当女性谈判者有强大的外部选择时，谈判结果中的性别差距才存在。此外，我们的大数据集使我们能够研究一个研究较少的表现结果——僵局发生率。我们发现，至少有一名谈判者是有强大替代方案的女性的谈判，极有可能以僵局告终，这种表现结果会使相当大的潜在价值未得到分配。此外，我们发现谈判表现中的这些性别差异并非由于期望、保留价值或首次报价方面的性别差异。总体而言，这些发现与反弹观点一致，即当一方是由强大替代方案赋予权力的女性谈判者时，对方达成协议的可能性较小，因此可能会导致更糟糕的结果。（PsycInfo数据库记录（c）2025美国心理学会，保留所有权利）
