Levy Neil
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Erkenntnis. 2025;90(5):2077-2094. doi: 10.1007/s10670-024-00794-8. Epub 2024 Mar 8.
The novice/expert problem is the problem of knowing which apparent expert to trust. Following Alvin Goldman's lead, a number of philosophers have developed criteria that novices can use to distinguish more from less trustworthy experts. While the criteria the philosophers have identified are indeed useful in guiding expert choice, I argue, they can't do the work that Goldman and his successors want from them: avoid a kind of testimonial scepticism. We can't deploy them in the way needed to avoid such scepticism, because it would take genuine expertise to do so. I argue that attempts to deploy them in this sort of deep way involve a kind of transgression akin to, and at least as unreliable as, epistemic trespassing. We should give up trying to solve the novice/expert problem and instead promote better epistemic trust.
新手/专家问题是指如何知道该信任哪位表面上的专家的问题。在阿尔文·戈德曼的引领下,许多哲学家制定了一些标准,新手可以用这些标准来区分可信度较高和较低的专家。虽然哲学家们确定的这些标准在指导专家选择方面确实有用,但我认为,它们无法完成戈德曼及其后继者期望它们完成的任务:避免某种证言怀疑论。我们无法以避免这种怀疑论所需的方式运用这些标准,因为这样做需要真正的专业知识。我认为,试图以这种深入的方式运用这些标准涉及一种类似于认知越界的违规行为,而且至少同样不可靠。我们应该放弃试图解决新手/专家问题,转而促进更好的认知信任。