Tauer C A
J Med Philos. 1985 Aug;10(3):253-66. doi: 10.1093/jmp/10.3.253.
Public policy decisions concerning embryos and fetuses tend to lack reasoned argument on their moral status. While agreement on personhood is elusive, this concept has unquestioned moral relevance. A stipulated usage of the term, the psychic sense of 'person', applies to early human prenatal life and encompasses morally relevant aspects of personhood. A 'person' in the psychic sense has a minimal psychology, defined as the capacity to retain experiences, which may be nonconscious, through physiological analogs of memory; and the potential to become a person in the full sense. Psychic personhood merits attribution of moral personhood because the experience of a 'person' in the psychic sense has continuity with the experience of a full person; and this experience begins to determine the development of the personal psychological characteristics of that individual. Psychic personhood is a rationally defensible boundary for invasive research involving human embryos and fetuses. Lacking precise empirical knowledge, policy makers could attribute psychic personhood at the time of earliest brainstem activity, that is, during the seventh week of fetal development.
关于胚胎和胎儿的公共政策决策往往缺乏对其道德地位的合理论证。虽然对人格的定义难以达成一致，但这一概念具有毋庸置疑的道德相关性。“人”这一术语的一种特定用法，即心理层面的“人”，适用于人类早期的产前生命，并涵盖了人格的道德相关方面。心理层面的“人”具有最低限度的心理，被定义为通过记忆的生理类似物保留可能是无意识体验的能力；以及成为完整意义上的人的潜力。心理层面的人格值得被赋予道德人格，因为心理层面的“人”的体验与完整的人的体验具有连续性；并且这种体验开始决定该个体个人心理特征的发展。心理层面的人格是涉及人类胚胎和胎儿的侵入性研究的合理可辩护界限。由于缺乏精确的实证知识，政策制定者可以在最早的脑干活动出现时，即胎儿发育的第七周，赋予其心理层面的人格。
