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The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2.严重急性呼吸综合征冠状病毒2(SARS-CoV-2)的近端起源。
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[新冠疫情在生物武器控制、生物安全与全球健康的关联中]

[The Covid19 pandemic in the nexus of biological weapons control, biosecurity and global health].

作者信息

Jakob Una

机构信息

Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK), Frankfurt/Main, Baseler Straße 27-31, 60329 Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland.

出版信息

Z Friedens Konfliktforsch. 2020;9(2):337-349. doi: 10.1007/s42597-020-00039-9. Epub 2020 Oct 7.

DOI:10.1007/s42597-020-00039-9
PMID:40477179
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7539552/
Abstract

The Covid19 pandemic can most likely be traced to a natural outbreak. Nevertheless, allegations that the novel corona virus was intentionally or accidentally released from a laboratory could exacerbate existing conflicts and tensions. The possession and use of biological weapons are prohibited by international law. The lack of transparency and of controls as well as legitimate biological research with high potential for misuse leave room for misinformation, misperceptions and suspicions, as has been the case with the Covid19 pandemic. Stronger mechanisms for verifying and investigating the bioweapons prohibition, stricter compliance procedures to deal with violations, and greater transparency for dual-use research of concern could help prevent biological attacks and contain negative political dynamics in case of unusual disease outbreaks. To that end, the Biological Weapons Convention would need to be strengthened, and the interplay of biological disarmament, biosecurity and global health would need to be more focussed. Having a clear division of labour and exploiting synergies, e.g. in health preparedness and in dealing with scientific and technological developments, would benefit both pandemic preparedness and biological disarmament.

摘要

新冠疫情极有可能源于自然爆发。然而,有关新冠病毒是从实验室有意或无意释放的指控可能会加剧现有冲突和紧张局势。国际法禁止拥有和使用生物武器。缺乏透明度和管控,以及具有高度滥用可能性的合法生物研究,为错误信息、误解和怀疑留下了空间,新冠疫情就是如此。加强核查和调查生物武器禁令的机制、处理违规行为的更严格合规程序,以及提高对两用性相关研究的透明度,有助于预防生物攻击,并在出现异常疾病爆发时遏制负面政治动态。为此,需要加强《生物武器公约》,并更专注于生物裁军、生物安全和全球卫生之间的相互作用。明确分工并利用协同效应,例如在卫生防备以及应对科技发展方面,将有利于大流行防备和生物裁军。