Rotella Amanda, Jung Jisoo, Chinn Christopher, Barclay Pat
Northumbria University, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Northumberland, UK.
University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2025 Jul 8:1461672251345512. doi: 10.1177/01461672251345512.
Moral licensing occurs when someone who initially behaves morally subsequently acts less morally. We apply reputation-based theories to predict when and why it occurs. As pre-registered, we predicted: (1) being observed would be associated with larger licensing effects and (2) unambiguous outcomes would have smaller licensing effects. In a multi-level meta-analysis of 115 experiments ( = 21,770), moral licensing was stronger when participants were observed ( = 0.65) than unobserved ( = 0.13). After accounting for publication bias with robust Bayesian meta-analysis, there was moderate evidence for licensing when participants were observed ( = 0.51; = 9.14), but moderate evidence against licensing when unobserved (Hedge's = -0.01; = 0.11). Ambiguity did not moderate moral licensing. These findings suggest that moral licensing is elicited through interpersonal motives, clarify when licensing (vs. consistency) occurs, and explain why many online studies failed to replicate. Evidence for intrapsychic motives is inconclusive.
当一个最初行为符合道德规范的人随后行为的道德程度降低时，就会出现道德许可现象。我们应用基于声誉的理论来预测它何时以及为何会发生。正如预先注册的那样，我们预测：（1）被观察到会与更大的许可效应相关联，以及（2）明确的结果会产生较小的许可效应。在对115项实验（N = 21,770）进行的多层次荟萃分析中，当参与者被观察到时（g = 0.65），道德许可比未被观察到时（g = 0.13）更强。在用稳健的贝叶斯荟萃分析考虑了发表偏倚之后，有适度的证据表明当参与者被观察到时存在许可现象（g = 0.51；z = 9.14），但当未被观察到时有适度的证据反对许可现象（赫奇斯g = -0.01；z = 0.11）。模糊性并未调节道德许可。这些发现表明道德许可是通过人际动机引发的，阐明了许可现象（相对于一致性）何时发生，并解释了为什么许多在线研究未能重复出相关结果。关于心理内部动机的证据尚无定论。
