Agich G J, Jones R P
J Med Philos. 1985 Nov;10(4):387-95. doi: 10.1093/jmp/10.4.387.
This article is an attempt to clarify a confusion in the brain death literature between logical sufficiency/necessity and natural sufficiency/necessity. We focus on arguments that draw conclusions regarding empirical matters of fact from conceptual or ontological definitions. Specifically, we critically analyze arguments by Tom Tomlinson and Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler, which, respectively, confuse logical and natural sufficiency and logical and natural necessity. Our own conclusion is that it is especially important in discussing the brain death issue to observe the distinction between logical and natural sufficiency/necessity in a strict fashion.
本文旨在澄清脑死亡文献中逻辑充分性/必要性与自然充分性/必要性之间的混淆。我们关注那些从概念或本体论定义得出关于经验事实结论的论证。具体而言，我们批判性地分析了汤姆·汤姆林森、迈克尔·B·格林和丹尼尔·维克勒的论证，他们分别混淆了逻辑充分性与自然充分性以及逻辑必要性与自然必要性。我们自己的结论是，在讨论脑死亡问题时，严格遵守逻辑充分性/必要性与自然充分性/必要性之间的区别尤为重要。
