Brody H
J Med Philos. 1983 May;8(2):187-96. doi: 10.1093/jmp/8.2.187.
It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.
有人认为，通常为采用脑死亡标准所给出的生物学或道德理由都不充分；唯一成功的论据是基于个人身份随大脑死亡而终止这一事实的本体论理由。但一种更令人满意的本体论方法是根据与身体相关的人的存在来分析脑死亡，而非个人身份。个人存在理由并非取代通常的生物学和道德论据，而是与它们协同作用。
