Neto Celso
Egenis - Centre for the Study of the Life Sciences, University of Exeter, Byrne House, St. Germain Road, Exeter, EX4 4PJ, UK.
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2025 Jul 30;47(3):39. doi: 10.1007/s40656-025-00684-4.
Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181-204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1-23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46-55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331-351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630 ; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115-145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer's BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer's BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer's metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the "science and values" literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c ; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829-839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215-238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer's BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer's already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.
生物种族实在论(以下简称BRR)是一种认为人类形成了生物学上不同群体的观点。近年来,奎肖恩·斯宾塞提出了该观点最详尽的版本之一,但他的理论面临几个问题(斯宾塞,《哲学研究》第159卷:第181 - 204页,2012年;斯宾塞,《哲学杂志》第111卷:第1 - 23页,2014年;斯宾塞,第52卷:第46 - 55页,2015年;斯宾塞,载于格拉斯哥、哈斯兰格、杰弗斯、斯宾塞编《什么是种族?四种哲学观点》,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2019年a;霍克曼,《哲学杂志》第110卷:第331 - 351页,2013年;格拉斯哥等人,载于格拉斯哥、哈斯兰格、杰弗斯、斯宾塞编《什么是种族?四种哲学观点》,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2019年;杰克逊,《哲学理论与实践生物学》第14卷,2022年。https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630 ;温斯伯格,《生物学哲学》第37卷:第46页,2022年;姆西芒,《哲学论文》第51卷:第115 - 145页,2022年;卡莱沃尔德,《种族的形而上学》,剑桥大学出版社,剑桥,2024年;贝伦斯坦,即将出版)。在本文中,我为斯宾塞的BRR提出另一个问题,认为他的理论没有充分考虑社会、政治和道德价值观如何影响种族的形而上学。斯宾塞的BRR涉及重大的认知和伦理风险,而这些风险间接影响了斯宾塞的形而上学结论。我借助“科学与价值观”文献来表明这一点,并与科学技术研究(STS)及人类学文献展开探讨(道格拉斯,《科学中的归纳风险与价值观》,200年。http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c ;道格拉斯,《科学、政策与价值无涉理想》,匹兹堡大学出版社,匹兹堡,2009年;布朗,《科学哲学》第80卷:第829 - 839页,2013年;布朗,《当前价值观与科学争议》,劳特利奇出版社,米尔顿公园,2017年;比德尔和库克拉,《探索归纳风险:科学中价值观的案例研究》第1卷:第215 - 238页,2017年;埃利奥特和理查兹,《探索归纳风险:科学中价值观的案例研究》,牛津大学出版社,牛津,2017年)。这种分析引发了关于价值观、社会责任和形而上学之间关系的更广泛问题。此前对斯宾塞BRR的批评几乎未触及这些问题。因此,通过批判性地讨论斯宾塞本就问题重重的观点所存在的问题,我的主要目标是开启对于此类重要问题的辩论。