Libet B, Wright E W, Feinstein B, Pearl D K
Brain. 1979 Mar;102(1):193-224. doi: 10.1093/brain/102.1.193.
Subjective experience of a peripherally-induced sensation is found to appear without the substantial delay found for the experience of a cortically-induced sensation. To explain this finding, in relation to the putative delay of up to about 500 ms for achieving the "neuronal adequacy" required to elicit the peripherally-induced experience, a modified hypothesis is proposed: for a peripheral sensory input, (a) the primary evoked response of sensory cortex to the specific projection (lemniscal) input is associated with a process that can serve as a 'time-marker'; and (b), after delayed neuronal adequacy is achieved, there is a subjective referral of the sensory experience backwards in time so as to coincide with this initial 'time-marker'. A crucial prediction of the hypothesis was experimentally tested in human subjects using suitably implanted electrodes, and the results provide specific support for the proposal. In this, the test stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) and to surface of somatosensory cortex (C) were arranged so that a minimum train duration of 200 ms or more was required to produce any conscious sensory experience in each case. Each such cerebral stimulus could be temporally coupled with a peripheral one (usually skin, S) that required relatively negligible stimulus duration to produce a sensation. The sensory experiences induced by LM stimuli were found to be subjectively timed as if there were no delay relative to those for S, that is, as if the subjective experience for LM was referred to the onset rather than to the end of the required stimulus duration of 200 ms or more. On the other hand, sensory experiences induced by the C stimuli, which did not excite specific projection afferents, appeared to be subjectively timed with a substantial delay relative to those for S, that is, as if the time of the subjective experience coincided roughly with the end of the minimum duration required by the C stimuli. The newly proposed functional role for the specific projection system in temporal referral would be additional to its known role in spatial referral and discrimination. A temporal discrepancy between corresponding mental and physical events, i.e., between the timing of a subjective sensory experience and the time at which the state of 'neuronal adequacy' for giving rise to this experience is achieved, would introduce a novel experimentally-based feature into the concept of psychophysiological parallelism in the mind-brain relationship.
研究发现,由外周诱导的感觉的主观体验出现时,没有像皮质诱导的感觉体验那样出现明显延迟。为了解释这一发现,针对引发外周诱导体验所需的“神经元充分性”可能存在的长达约500毫秒的延迟,提出了一个修正假说:对于外周感觉输入,(a)感觉皮层对特定投射(薄束)输入的初级诱发反应与一个可作为“时间标记”的过程相关联;(b)在达到延迟的神经元充分性后,感觉体验会在时间上向后主观回溯,以便与这个初始的“时间标记”重合。该假说的一个关键预测在人类受试者中使用适当植入的电极进行了实验测试,结果为该提议提供了具体支持。在此实验中,对内侧丘系(LM)和体感皮层表面(C)的测试刺激被安排成,在每种情况下,产生任何有意识的感觉体验都需要至少200毫秒或更长的脉冲串持续时间。每个这样的脑刺激都可以在时间上与一个外周刺激(通常是皮肤,S)耦合,外周刺激产生感觉所需的刺激持续时间相对可忽略不计。发现由LM刺激诱导的感觉体验在主观上的计时方式,就好像相对于S刺激没有延迟一样,也就是说,就好像LM刺激的主观体验被回溯到所需的200毫秒或更长刺激持续时间的开始而不是结束。另一方面,由不激发特定投射传入纤维的C刺激诱导的感觉体验,在主观计时上相对于S刺激似乎有明显延迟,也就是说,就好像主观体验的时间大致与C刺激所需的最短持续时间结束时重合。特定投射系统在时间回溯方面新提出的功能作用将是其在空间回溯和辨别方面已知作用之外的补充。相应的心理和物理事件之间的时间差异,即主观感觉体验的计时与产生该体验的“神经元充分性”状态达成的时间之间的差异,将在脑-心关系的心理生理平行论概念中引入一个基于实验的新特征。