Libet Benjamin
Center for Neuroscience, University of California, Davis, 95616, USA.
Conscious Cogn. 2006 Sep;15(3):540-7. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2005.03.001. Epub 2006 Jul 18.
In this "Reply" paper, the arguments and experimental findings by Pockett, Pollen, and Haggard et al. are analyzed. It had been shown () that a 0.5s duration of repetitive activations of sensory cortex is required to produce a threshold of sensation. The view that this is due to a facilitatory buildup in excitatory state to finally elicit neuronal firing is shown to be incompatible with several lines of evidence. Objections to the phenomenon of subjective referral backwards in time (for the delayed sensation) are also untenable. report that a self-initiated act can, under hypnotic suggestion, appear to the subject to be "involuntary." The act under hypnosis is better viewed as one initiated unconsciously, not as an act of conscious will.