Friedland R
Int J Health Serv. 1979;9(2):191-206. doi: 10.2190/6EYY-6412-GC7L-M51Y.
State intervention in the consumption process has become increasingly critical to economic growth on the one hand and to real family income on the other. The social wage thus tends to become a conflictual political issue. As a result, the articulation of state intervention with the changing requirements of economic growth is subject to continuous political challenge. This special issue examines the problematic relationship between state intervention in social services and the organization of the capitalist economy. Some contributors study the ways in which state inter ventions are structured so as to be consonant with the requirements of economic growth and profitability, as well as the difficulties such structures pose. Feshbach's analysis of the Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Program and Mollenkopf's study of San Francisco's public transit system both reflect this concern. Other contributors study the ways in which the organization of the economy constrains the development of democratically responsive social services. Sbragia's study of the capital market and public housing in Italy and Taylor's study of free medical clinics in the U.S. both reflect this concern. Finally, contributors study macroscopic transformations in the relationship between state intervention and the organization of the capitalist economy. Esping-Andersen's study of the political logic of increasing state intervention in production and Hirschhorn's analysis of the defunctionalization of social services attendent upon the disaccumulative tendencies in capitalism both reflect this concern. This introductory paper reviews four theories which attempt to explain how state intervention is insulated from democratic controls. For each theory, the mechanisms specified to perform this function are subject to weaknesses. An attempt is made to position the contributions to this volume with respect to these theoretical traditions.
一方面，国家对消费过程的干预对于经济增长愈发关键；另一方面，对于家庭实际收入也至关重要。因此，社会工资往往会成为一个具有争议性的政治问题。结果，国家干预与经济增长不断变化的要求之间的协调，受到持续的政治挑战。本期特刊探讨了国家对社会服务的干预与资本主义经济组织之间的问题关系。一些撰稿人研究了国家干预的构建方式，使其符合经济增长和盈利能力的要求，以及这些结构所带来的困难。费什巴赫对希尔 - 伯顿医院建设项目的分析以及莫伦科普夫对旧金山公共交通系统的研究都反映了这一关切。其他撰稿人研究了经济组织对民主回应型社会服务发展的制约方式。斯布拉吉亚对意大利资本市场和公共住房的研究以及泰勒对美国免费医疗诊所的研究都反映了这一关切。最后，撰稿人研究了国家干预与资本主义经济组织之间关系的宏观转变。埃斯平 - 安德森对国家在生产中干预增加的政治逻辑的研究以及赫希霍恩对伴随资本主义非积累趋势而来的社会服务功能失调的分析都反映了这一关切。这篇引言性文章回顾了四种试图解释国家干预如何免受民主控制的理论。对于每种理论，为履行这一功能所指定的机制都存在弱点。本文试图将本卷中的文章置于这些理论传统的背景下进行定位。
