Meyers C
J Med Ethics. 1984 Sep;10(3):128-30. doi: 10.1136/jme.10.3.128.
This article argues that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction has little or no moral value when preservation of life is not given a near absolute status. What is appealed to instead is a determination of both medical and moral duties, upon which appropriate treatment decisions should be based. Included is a partial delineation of those duties.
本文认为，当生命的保存未被赋予近乎绝对的地位时，普通/特殊的区分几乎没有或根本没有道德价值。相反，所诉诸的是对医学和道德责任的确定，恰当的治疗决策应基于这些责任。其中包括对这些责任的部分描述。
