Frey R G
J Med Ethics. 1983 Jun;9(2):94-7. doi: 10.1136/jme.9.2.94.
If one wishes to accept that some painful animal experimentation can be justified on grounds that benefit is conferred, one is faced with a difficult moral dilemma argues the first author, a philosopher. Either one needs to be able to say why human lives of any quality however low should be inviolable from painful experimentation when animal lives are not; or one should accept that sufficient benefit can justify certain painful experiments on human beings of sufficiently low quality of life. Alternatively, one can reject the original premise and accept antivivisectionism. Replies to his paper follow from an antivivisectionist philosopher and an eminent pharmacologist long involved in animal experimentation. Dr Frey responds to both replies.
第一作者是一位哲学家，他认为，如果有人希望接受某些痛苦的动物实验基于能带来益处的理由是合理的，那么就会面临一个艰难的道德困境。要么必须能够说明为什么无论生活质量多低的人类生命都应免受痛苦实验的侵害，而动物生命却并非如此；要么就应该接受足够的益处可以为对生活质量足够低的人类进行某些痛苦实验提供正当理由。或者，也可以拒绝最初的前提，接受反活体解剖主义。一位反活体解剖主义哲学家和一位长期从事动物实验的著名药理学家对他的论文进行了回应。弗雷博士对这两种回应都做出了答复。
