Suppr超能文献

合作的演变

The evolution of cooperation.

作者信息

Axelrod R, Hamilton W D

出版信息

Science. 1981 Mar 27;211(4489):1390-6. doi: 10.1126/science.7466396.

Abstract

Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

摘要

自达尔文时代以来,生物之间的合作,无论是细菌还是灵长类动物,一直是进化理论中的一个难题。假设个体之间的互动是基于概率发生的,在囚徒困境博弈的背景下,基于进化稳定策略的概念建立了一个模型。该模型的推导以及计算机竞赛的结果表明,基于互惠的合作如何能在一个非社会性的世界中开始,如何能在与多种其他策略的互动中蓬勃发展,以及一旦完全建立起来如何能抵御入侵。潜在的应用包括领地性、交配和疾病的具体方面。

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验