Bechtel W
Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St Louis, MO 63130, USA.
Neuropsychologia. 1995 Sep;33(9):1075-86. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(95)00049-9.
While consciousness has not been a major concern of most AI researchers, some theorists have tried to explore how computational models might explain consciousness. I explore how far computational models might go in explaining consciousness, focusing on three aspects of conscious mental states: their intrinsic intentionality, the awareness a subject has of the contents of these intentional states, and the distinctive qualitative character of these states. I describe and evaluate strategies for developing connectionist systems that satisfy these aspects of consciousness.
虽然意识并非大多数人工智能研究者主要关注的问题,但一些理论家已尝试探索计算模型如何解释意识。我将探讨计算模型在解释意识方面能走多远,重点关注有意识心理状态的三个方面:它们的内在意向性、主体对这些意向状态内容的觉知,以及这些状态独特的质性特征。我将描述并评估开发满足意识这些方面的联结主义系统的策略。