Lilienfeld S O, Marino L
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, USA.
J Abnorm Psychol. 1995 Aug;104(3):411-20. doi: 10.1037//0021-843x.104.3.411.
J. C. Wakefield (1992a, 1992b, 1993) recently proposed that mental disorder is best conceptualized as a "harmful dysfunction," whereby "harm" is a value judgment regarding the undesirability of a condition, and "dysfunction" is the failure of a system to function as designed by natural selection. The authors maintain, however, that (a) many mental functions are not direct evolutionary adaptations, but rather adaptively neutral by-products of adaptations, (b) Wakefield's concept of the evolutionarily designed response neglects the fact that natural selection almost invariably results in substantial variability across individuals, and (c) many consensual disorders represent evolutionarily adaptive reactions to danger or loss. The authors propose that mental disorder is a Roschian concept characterized by instrinsically fuzzy boundaries and that Wakefield's analysis may only prolong scientific debate on a fundamentally nonscientific issue.
J. C. 韦克菲尔德（1992a、1992b、1993）最近提出，精神障碍最好被概念化为一种“有害功能失调”，其中“有害”是关于一种状况不受欢迎程度的价值判断，而“功能失调”是一个系统未能按自然选择所设计的那样发挥功能。然而，作者们认为：（a）许多心理功能并非直接的进化适应，而是适应的适应性中性副产品；（b）韦克菲尔德关于进化设计反应的概念忽视了这样一个事实，即自然选择几乎总是导致个体之间存在大量差异；（c）许多共识性障碍代表了对危险或损失的进化适应性反应。作者们提出，精神障碍是一个具有内在模糊边界的罗施概念，韦克菲尔德的分析可能只会延长关于一个根本上不科学问题的科学辩论。
