Lilienfeld S O, Marino L
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, USA.
J Abnorm Psychol. 1999 Aug;108(3):400-11. doi: 10.1037//0021-843x.108.3.400.
J. C. Wakefield's (1999) elaboration of his harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of mental disorder does little to address previous criticisms (S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995) and instead reveals further conceptual weaknesses in his position. The authors demonstrate that (a) a Roschian analysis can account for the results of all of Wakefield's conceptual experiments and predicts a number of judgments of disorder not predicted by the HDA, (b) the HDA is incapable in many cases of providing a scientifically nonarbitrary distinction between disorder and nondisorder, and (c) the HDA cannot account for failures of cultural ex adaptations, mismatches between evolutionary design and novel environments, or defenses against threat. The authors argue that the HDA has been convincingly falsified and discuss the failure of essentialistic concepts to resolve controversies in other domains of biological science.
J. C. 韦克菲尔德（1999年）对其精神障碍的有害功能障碍分析（HDA）的阐述，几乎没有解决先前的批评意见（S. O. 利连菲尔德和L. 马里诺，1995年），反而揭示了他立场中进一步的概念弱点。作者们证明：（a）一种罗施式分析能够解释韦克菲尔德所有概念实验的结果，并预测了一些HDA未预测到的障碍判断；（b）在许多情况下，HDA无法在科学上提供一种非任意的障碍与非障碍区分；（c）HDA无法解释文化适应失败、进化设计与新环境之间的不匹配，或对威胁的防御。作者们认为HDA已被令人信服地证伪，并讨论了本质主义概念在解决生物科学其他领域争议方面的失败。
