Patzig G
Philosophisches Seminar der Universität, Göttingen.
Z Kardiol. 1994;83 Suppl 6:135-8.
If values are projections of human interests, prolongation of life cannot always be the highest value. Since the criterion of treatment decisions such cases must be the value of life for the individual concerned, besides "passive" euthanasia--which is widely accepted--also (indirectly and--in extreme cases--also directly) "active" euthanasia may be considered. The radical difference between this position and "euthanasia" in the "Third Reich" consists in the fact that, in our case, only the wishes and interests of the patient can be relevant, and not the decisions of authorities or considerations of expenses. Concerning the problem of just distribution of scarce medical resources, which will become more of on issue in the near future, simple solutions (e.g., a general age-limit for expensive therapy) are not helpful. More promising are considerations which start from the idea of a hypothetical health insurance, on the lines of J. Rawls' "Theory of justice".
如果价值观是人类利益的投射，那么延长生命不一定总是最高价值。由于此类情况下治疗决策的标准必须是关乎个体的生命价值，除了被广泛接受的“被动”安乐死之外，（间接且在极端情况下也直接地）“主动”安乐死也可以被考虑。这一立场与“第三帝国”的“安乐死”之间的根本区别在于，在我们这种情况下，只有患者的意愿和利益才是相关的，而不是当局的决定或费用方面的考虑。关于稀缺医疗资源的公正分配问题，在不久的将来这将成为一个更突出的问题，简单的解决方案（例如，对昂贵治疗设定一个通用的年龄限制）并无帮助。更有前景的是从假设的健康保险理念出发进行的思考，类似于J.罗尔斯的“正义论”。
