Mathews J E
Am J Law Med. 1993;19(4):523-46.
As health care reform pervades the United States, lawmakers have subjected physician self-referrals to heightened scrutiny. Recent evidence indicates that sending patients to facilities in which a physician has an ownership interest often causes overutilization, overpricing, and lower quality of care. This Note analyzes how physician self-referral arrangements can have negative effects on competition. To combat the adverse effects, the Note examines how enforcing antitrust laws can ameliorate the self-referral dilemma and aid in restoring competition to the health care market. This solution will maintain the doctor's right to invest while protecting the patient's vulnerability.
随着医疗保健改革在美国全面推行，立法者对医生自我转诊进行了更严格的审查。最近的证据表明，将患者转诊至医生拥有所有权权益的机构往往会导致过度使用、定价过高以及医疗质量下降。本笔记分析了医生自我转诊安排如何会对竞争产生负面影响。为应对这些不利影响，本笔记探讨了实施反垄断法如何能够缓解自我转诊困境，并有助于恢复医疗保健市场的竞争。这一解决方案将在保护患者脆弱性的同时，维护医生的投资权。
