Kelly M, Buchanan-Smith M
Centre for International Health, Welsh Combined Centres for Public Health, University of Wales College of Medicine, Cardiff, UK.
Disasters. 1994 Mar;18(1):16-34. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.1994.tb00282.x.
By the end of 1991, less than half the amount of relief food requested for North Sudan at the beginning of the year had been delivered. Despite ample evidence of social and economic stress and high rates of child malnutrition, many donors felt that relief needs had been exaggerated, and were unwilling to accept that relief assistance was urgently needed. The feeble response of the main food aid donors is explained initially by the politics of relief in 1990/91, which seriously delayed the launch of the relief operation. These problems were compounded by an oversimplified understanding of famine among some sections of the relief community, and by the orientation of the international relief system to crisis indicators. Toward the end of 1991, donors argued that despite the shortfall in relief assistance there had been no deaths from starvation, and therefore local people had 'coped' better than expected. This paper challenges that view by arguing that excess deaths did occur, but went unnoticed and unremarked. Local people's 'coping strategies', which supposedly 'saved the day', actually had very negative and sometimes fatal consequences.
到1991年底，年初为苏丹北部申请的救济食品交付量还不到一半。尽管有充分证据表明存在社会和经济压力以及儿童营养不良率很高的情况，但许多捐助者认为救济需求被夸大了，并且不愿意承认迫切需要救济援助。主要粮食援助捐助者反应不力，最初是由于1990/91年救济工作的政治因素，这严重拖延了救济行动的启动。救济界某些部门对饥荒的过度简化理解以及国际救济系统对危机指标的关注，使这些问题更加复杂。到1991年底，捐助者辩称，尽管救济援助存在缺口，但没有出现饿死的情况，因此当地民众“应对”得比预期更好。本文对这一观点提出质疑，认为确实发生了超额死亡，但未被注意到和提及。当地民众所谓“拯救局面”的“应对策略”，实际上产生了非常负面甚至有时是致命的后果。
