David A S, Howard R
Department of Psychological Medicine, King's College Hospital, London.
Psychol Med. 1994 May;24(2):515-24. doi: 10.1017/s0033291700027471.
A preliminary model is described to account for the 'reality testing' of memories (after Johnson & Raye, 1981) in an attempt to explain delusional memory. Two routes are proposed: route one involves evaluation of the factual content of the memories against stored general knowledge. Route two relies on the evaluation of the perceptual and narrative characteristics of memories with the assumption that the stronger these characteristics, the more likely the memory is to be real. The integrity of these routes is examined in four patients with delusional memories, using standardized tests. The results suggest that in these cases, general knowledge is essentially intact while the perceptual characteristics of delusional memories are stronger than real memories which in turn, are stronger than fantasies. This could lead the evaluation system to accept delusional memories as true memories despite their implausibility. The roles of rehearsal and affect are probably important in this and require further study.
本文描述了一个初步模型，用于解释记忆的“现实检验”（基于约翰逊和雷伊，1981年），试图解释妄想性记忆。提出了两条途径：途径一涉及根据存储的常识评估记忆的事实内容。途径二依赖于对记忆的感知和叙事特征的评估，假设这些特征越强，记忆就越有可能是真实的。使用标准化测试，对四名患有妄想性记忆的患者的这些途径的完整性进行了检查。结果表明，在这些案例中，常识基本完好无损，而妄想性记忆的感知特征比真实记忆更强，真实记忆又比幻想更强。这可能导致评估系统将妄想性记忆当作真实记忆接受，尽管它们难以置信。复述和情感的作用在这方面可能很重要，需要进一步研究。
