Freestone D S, Mitchell H
Wellcome Foundation Ltd, London.
BMJ. 1993 Apr 24;306(6885):1112-4. doi: 10.1136/bmj.306.6885.1112.
There is increasing evidence of fraud in clinical research, and one aspect concerns trading in pharmaceutical company shares by people who may have confidential information about the results of clinical trials. Plainly this has implications for honest investigators, who may find themselves exposed to such allegations. In this paper Dr D S Freestone and Mr H Mitchell, QC, identify three interlinked issues which they think underlie the potential for these allegations. They are pressure for premature or inappropriate communication of research results; trading in pharmaceutical company shares by academic clinical investigators; and the possibility that clinical investigators might succumb to temptation. Dr Freestone and Mr Mitchell suggest that whenever possible results of clinical studies should be published in appropriate medical journals without prior public disclosure. This conflicts with Stock Exchange rules, which require that price sensitive information should be published at the earliest opportunity and preclude priority of publication in medical journals. Freestone and Mitchell believe that rarely rapid public disclosure is acceptable if it is to protect patients' interests but that it must not prejudice publication in the medical or scientific press. When rapid public disclosure is needed, they say, every attempt should be made to inform prescribers before patients. Dr Freestone and Mr Mitchell warn that academic clinical investigators who have access to unpublished price sensitive information about pharmaceutical companies whose shares they trade in will almost certainly be in breach of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. Furthermore, disclosing such information to third parties, they say, exposes those people also to potential criminal liability. Freestone and Mitchell advise that when potential for allegations of conflict of interest exists clinical investigators should consider declaring their position to ethics committees and any sponsoring organisations.
临床研究中欺诈行为的证据越来越多,其中一个方面涉及到可能掌握临床试验结果机密信息的人员买卖制药公司股票。显然,这对诚实的研究人员有影响,他们可能会发现自己面临此类指控。在本文中,D·S·弗里estone博士和御用大律师H·米切尔先生指出了他们认为构成这些指控可能性基础的三个相互关联的问题。它们是过早或不适当传达研究结果的压力;学术临床研究人员买卖制药公司股票;以及临床研究人员可能会屈服于诱惑的可能性。弗里estone博士和米切尔先生建议,只要有可能,临床研究结果应在不事先公开披露的情况下发表在合适的医学期刊上。这与证券交易所的规则相冲突,证券交易所规则要求应尽早公布价格敏感信息,并排除在医学期刊上优先发表的可能性。弗里estone和米切尔认为,如果是为了保护患者利益,很少情况下快速公开披露是可以接受的,但绝不能损害在医学或科学媒体上的发表。他们说,当需要快速公开披露时,应尽一切努力在告知患者之前先通知开处方的医生。弗里estone博士和米切尔先生警告说,能够获取其交易股票的制药公司未公布的价格敏感信息的学术临床研究人员几乎肯定违反了1985年《公司证券(内幕交易)法》。此外,他们说,向第三方披露此类信息也会使这些人面临潜在的刑事责任。弗里estone和米切尔建议,当存在利益冲突指控的可能性时,临床研究人员应考虑向伦理委员会和任何赞助组织声明自己的立场。