Grüning J
Rehabilitation (Stuttg). 1996 May;35(2):126-8.
Children with profound disablement (hence, in conclusion, all individuals with profound mental retardation) are denied to possess personhood by the bioethicist Peter Singer, on the ground that they lack the capability of reason, of consciousness of self, and of self-determination. The article seeks to point out that Singer's concept of the person is too narrow: the very disposition for development of these abilities in itself is a constituent of personhood. Human social and spiritual interwovenness is considered another essential constituent. Finally, the fundamental difference between "life worth" and "quality of life" is pointed out, a differentiation which goes unnoticed with Singer. From the premises outlined, and in contrast to Singer's ethics of (one's own) personal happiness, emerges an ethics of solidarity, and of love, bearing also on the issues of euthanasia, abortion, and prenatal diagnostics.
生物伦理学家彼得·辛格认为，严重残疾的儿童（因此，总的来说，所有重度智力迟钝者）不具备人格，理由是他们缺乏理性能力、自我意识和自我决定能力。本文旨在指出，辛格的人格概念过于狭隘：这些能力本身的发展倾向就是人格的一个组成部分。人类社会和精神的交织被认为是另一个重要组成部分。最后，指出了“生命价值”和“生活质量”之间的根本区别，而辛格没有注意到这一区别。从上述前提出发，与辛格的（个人）幸福伦理相反，出现了一种团结和爱的伦理，这也涉及安乐死、堕胎和产前诊断等问题。
