Robinson E J, Mitchell P, Nye R
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, UK.
J Child Lang. 1995 Oct;22(3):663-85. doi: 10.1017/s0305000900009995.
In two investigations (N = 62 and 59), three- and four-year-old children sometimes disbelieved what they were told about the unexpected contents of a deceptive box, even when they had seen the adult speaker look inside the box before s/he told them what s/he saw, and despite being able to recall the utterance: utterances were treated as unreliable sources of knowledge compared with seeing directly. Those who did believe the utterance were no better at recalling their prior belief about the box's contents (now treated as false), than those who saw inside the box. However using a narrative procedure, we replicated Zaitchik's (1991) result that children are more likely to acknowledge another's belief when they are told about reality, than when they see reality for themselves. We argue that these children were acknowledging alternative rather than false belief.
在两项研究（N分别为62和59）中，三四岁的儿童有时会不相信他们被告知的关于一个具有欺骗性盒子里意外内容的信息，即使他们看到成人说话者在告诉他们所看到的东西之前往盒子里看了，并且尽管他们能够回忆起所说的话：与直接看到相比，话语被视为不可靠的知识来源。那些相信话语的人在回忆他们之前关于盒子内容的信念（现在被视为错误信念）方面，并不比那些往盒子里看的人更好。然而，使用一种叙述程序，我们重复了扎伊奇克（1991）的结果，即当孩子们被告知现实时，比当他们自己看到现实时，他们更有可能承认他人的信念。我们认为这些孩子承认的是不同的信念而非错误信念。
