Tranöy K E
Center for Medical Ethics, University of Oslo.
Med Law. 1996;15(2):183-8.
Ethics and law are actually dependent and closely interacting, but also in some measure autonomous disciplines. Their balanced interaction is important for the attainment of a common aim and purpose: a good and just society. We now tend to agree that some but not all human rights should be supported by legislation. Some human rights are rooted in vital needs: the denial of a vital need causes death or serious disability. Rights rooted in needs recognized as vital have an exceptional long moral foundation. But "NN has a right to x" can be understood in two ways: either as a right to seek fulfillment of the need with the means and money at his disposal, or as a right to obtain fulfillment of the need. Article 25 of the U.N. declaration of human rights recognizes the right to health care as a human right. Clearly, need for health care in cases of serious illness should be understood in sense: as vital need generating not only (in sense 1)" a weak right to seek, but (in sense 2) a strong right to obtain fulfillment. This amounts to a powerful moral argument for the use of legislation to establish equal access for all to (at least) "basic" health care. Even if this is "no more" than a moral argument, it does have the advantage over legislation that the validity of a moral argument is not restricted by national borders.
伦理与法律实际上相互依存且紧密互动，但在某种程度上也是自主的学科。它们的平衡互动对于实现一个共同目标至关重要：一个美好且公正的社会。我们现在倾向于认同部分而非全部人权应由立法予以支持。一些人权植根于至关重要的需求：对至关重要需求的剥夺会导致死亡或严重残疾。植根于被视为至关重要需求的权利有着格外悠久的道德基础。但“NN有权享有x”可从两种方式来理解：要么是有权以其可支配的手段和金钱寻求满足该需求，要么是有权获得该需求的满足。《联合国人权宣言》第25条将获得医疗保健的权利确认为一项人权。显然，在重病情况下对医疗保健的需求应从这种意义上来理解：作为一种至关重要的需求，它不仅产生（在第一种意义上）“一种寻求的微弱权利”，而且（在第二种意义上）产生一种获得满足的强大权利。这构成了一个有力的道德论据，支持利用立法来确保所有人都能平等获得（至少）“基本”医疗保健。即便这“只不过”是一个道德论据，但它相对于立法确实具有优势，即道德论据的有效性不受国界限制。
