Loewy E H
University of California, Davis, USA.
Theor Med. 1997 Mar-Jun;18(1-2):79-97.
This paper discusses the possibility of finding an ethic of at least partial and perhaps ever-growing content in a world not that of moral strangers (where we have nothing except our desire to live freely to unite us) and one of moral friends (in which values, goals and ways of doing things are held in common). I argue that both the world of moral strangers which Engelhardt's world view would support, as the world of moral friends which is the one Pellegrino seeks both are untenable and that furthermore both can lead to a similar state of affairs. I suggest a dynamic world of moral acquaintances in which different belief systems and ways of doing things can come to some broad agreements about some essential thing. This is made possible because although we do not share the intimate framework Pellegrino might suggest, yet we are united by a much broader framework than the one moral strangers share.
本文探讨了在一个既非道德陌生人的世界（在这个世界里，除了自由生活的愿望外，我们没有任何东西能将我们团结在一起）也非道德朋友的世界（在这个世界里，价值观、目标和做事方式是共有的）中，找到一种至少部分内容且可能不断增长的伦理的可能性。我认为，恩格尔哈特世界观所支持的道德陌生人的世界，以及佩莱格里诺所追求的道德朋友的世界，都是站不住脚的，而且两者都可能导致类似的情况。我提出了一个道德熟人的动态世界，在这个世界里，不同的信仰体系和做事方式可以就一些基本问题达成一些广泛的共识。这之所以成为可能，是因为尽管我们没有佩莱格里诺可能提出的那种亲密框架，但我们被一个比道德陌生人所共有的框架更广泛的框架团结在一起。
