Zilinskas R A
Center for Public Issues in Biotechnology, University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, College Park 20740, USA.
JAMA. 1997 Aug 6;278(5):418-24.
Between 1985 and April 1991, Iraq developed anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin for biological warfare; 200 bombs and 25 ballistic missiles laden with biological agents were deployed by the time Operation Desert Storm occurred. Although cause for concern, if used during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq's biological warfare arsenal probably would have been militarily ineffective for 3 reasons: (1) it was small; (2) payload dispersal mechanisms were inefficient; and (3) coalition forces dominated the theater of war (ie, they had overwhelming air superiority and had crippled Iraq's command and control capability). Despite the Gulf War defeat, the Iraqi biological warfare threat has not been extinguished. Saddam Hussein remains in power, and his desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction continues unabated. In this context, the international community must be firm in its enforcement of United Nations resolutions designed to deter Iraq from reacquiring biological warfare capability and must take steps to develop a multidisciplinary approach to limiting future development of weapons of mass destruction.
1985年至1991年4月期间，伊拉克研制了用于生物战的炭疽、肉毒杆菌毒素和黄曲霉毒素；到“沙漠风暴行动”发生时，已部署了200枚装有生物制剂的炸弹和25枚弹道导弹。尽管令人担忧，但如果在海湾战争期间使用，伊拉克的生物战武器库可能在军事上无效，原因有三点：（1）规模小；（2）弹头散布机制效率低下；（3）联军控制了战区（即他们拥有压倒性的空中优势，削弱了伊拉克的指挥控制能力）。尽管在海湾战争中战败，但伊拉克的生物战威胁并未消除。萨达姆·侯赛因仍然掌权，他获取大规模杀伤性武器的欲望丝毫未减。在这种情况下，国际社会必须坚决执行旨在阻止伊拉克重新获得生物战能力 的联合国决议，并必须采取措施制定一种多学科方法来限制未来大规模杀伤性武器的发展。
