Sjolander S
Institute fur Humanbiologie, Universitat Wien, Althanstrasse 14, Wien, A-1020, Austria
J Theor Biol. 1997 Aug;187(4):595-600.
The discussion of the evolutionary origins of consciousness has largely been concentrated to the human mind, and it is only in recent years that a comparative ethological view has come into play. Even here, a tendency has been to look mainly at the primates. There is a vast literature that discusses the differences between human consciousness and cognition, compared with that of the other primates, but much less attention has been given to the fact that evolutionary gaps-fulgurations, emergences, new systems-have occurred at many stages in the evolution of cognition. More especially, the complexity of rather simple cognitive systems in lower animals has been underestimated, as well as the necessary prerequisites for a cognition worthy of the name to exist. Of particular interest in the discussion has been the views from evolutionary epistemology and radical constructivism, since they support the ethologically founded view that mind representations do not depict reality, but are adaptations for a successful way of behaving in the physical world, that reality in this sense is in the mind, that there are many realities, varying for different species-rich or poor in complexity-but all of them basically of the same nature. Even such human achievements as mathematics or logic thus may be seen as specific cognitive adaptions in our species, not as independent aspects of the physical world. Copyright 1997 Academic Press Limited
关于意识的进化起源的讨论主要集中在人类思维上,直到最近几年,一种比较行为学的观点才开始发挥作用。即便如此,人们也倾向于主要关注灵长类动物。有大量文献讨论了人类意识和认知与其他灵长类动物的差异,但对于认知进化的许多阶段出现了进化差距——突变、涌现、新系统——这一事实的关注却少得多。更具体地说,低等动物中相当简单的认知系统的复杂性以及名副其实的认知存在的必要前提都被低估了。在讨论中特别有趣的是进化认识论和激进建构主义的观点,因为它们支持基于行为学的观点,即心理表征并不描绘现实,而是对在物理世界中成功行为方式的适应,从这个意义上说现实存在于思维中,存在许多现实,因不同物种而不同——复杂性有高有低——但它们本质上基本相同。因此,即使是数学或逻辑等人类成就也可能被视为我们这个物种特有的认知适应,而不是物理世界的独立方面。版权所有1\997学术出版社有限公司