Webster A J
Department of Clinical Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, UK.
Naturwissenschaften. 1998 Jun;85(6):262-9. doi: 10.1007/s001140050496.
The topic of this review was suggested to me by the Council of the International Ethological Congress, who invited me, a non-ethologist, to address an international gathering of the most eminent of ethologists in Vienna, the birthplace of ethology, and call into question the relevance of science in general, and their scientific discipline in particular, to one of their most ardently sought goals, namely the improvement, through improved understanding, of the welfare of other sentient animals. My concern is to question the quality and utility of science in general and ethology in particular as applied to animal welfare. This topic has in the past provoked me to some severe criticism, for example, 'A lot of well-intended welfare research is neither very good science nor very helpful to the animals.... Too much welfare research is (in my opinion) flawed either because it is oversimplistic, or because it is not so much designed to test preconceptions but to reinforce prejudice' (Webster 1994). Dawkins (1997) has recently responded to this challenge, addressing the question 'Why has there not been more progress in welfare research?' Her response is concerned largely with applied ethology. My own criticism was not directed at ethologists in particular. I was more concerned by the misuse of scientific method by those who seek to obtain a so-called 'objective' measurement of something which they preconceive to be a stress (e.g., measurement of plasma concentrations of cortisol or endorphins in animals following transportation). Here the 'objective' measure frequently becomes the test that gives the answer that they want, and if it fails, then they seek other 'objective' markers until they achieve a set of measurements that supports the subjective impression which they had at the outset. My second main concern is that the welfare state of a sentient animal is a very complex affair and cannot be embraced by any single scientific discipline, be it ethology, physiology, molecular or neurobiology. Unfortunately it is also too complex to be embraced by a single-sentence definition. The best I can do is to suggest that it is determined by the capacity of an animal to sustain physical fitness and avoid mental suffering. The assessment of this is necessarily multidisciplinary.
本次综述的主题是由国际动物行为学大会理事会向我提议的，他们邀请我这个非动物行为学家，在动物行为学的发源地维也纳，向一群最杰出的国际动物行为学家发表演讲，并质疑一般科学，尤其是他们的科学学科，对于他们最热切追求的目标之一，即通过增进理解来改善其他有感知动物的福利的相关性。我关注的是质疑一般科学，尤其是应用于动物福利的动物行为学的质量和效用。这个话题过去曾引发我一些严厉的批评，例如，“许多善意的福利研究既不是很好的科学，对动物也没有太大帮助……太多的福利研究（在我看来）存在缺陷，要么是因为过于简单化，要么是因为它与其说是为了检验先入之见，不如说是为了强化偏见”（韦伯斯特，1994年）。道金斯（1997年）最近回应了这一挑战，探讨了“为什么福利研究没有取得更多进展？”这个问题。她的回答主要涉及应用动物行为学。我自己的批评并非特别针对动物行为学家。我更关注的是那些试图对他们预先认定为一种压力的东西进行所谓“客观”测量的人对科学方法的滥用（例如，测量运输后动物体内皮质醇或内啡肽的血浆浓度）。在这里，“客观”测量常常变成了能给出他们想要答案的测试，如果测试结果不支持，他们就会寻找其他“客观”指标，直到得到一组支持他们最初主观印象的测量结果。我的第二个主要担忧是，有感知动物的福利状况是一件非常复杂的事情，任何单一的科学学科，无论是动物行为学、生理学、分子生物学还是神经生物学，都无法涵盖。不幸的是，它也过于复杂，无法用一句话来定义。我所能做的最好的建议是，它是由动物维持身体健康和避免精神痛苦的能力决定的。对此的评估必然是多学科的。
