Weisbard A J
University of Wisconsin School of Law, Madison.
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 1993 Jun;3(2):217-30. doi: 10.1353/ken.0.0042.
The Pittsburgh protocol relies heavily on traditional moral distinctions, particularly the principle of double effect, to justify "managing" the dying process of a prospective organ donor in order to yield viable organs for transplantation. These traditional moral distinctions can be useful, particularly in casuistic or case-specific moral analysis, but their invocation here is unpersuasive, and potentially dangerous. The protocol relies on elaborate apologetics to avoid a candid confrontation with the moral challenge it poses--society's willingness to bring about the death of one patient (in isolation and with potential discomfort) in order to benefit another patient. Not only will this protocol fail to solve the problem it purports to address, it threatens to undermine the delicate social accommodations by which we distinguish the living from the dead, permissible "allowings to die" from impermissible killings, and those from whom organs may be removed from those whose bodies must remain inviolate.
匹兹堡协议严重依赖传统的道德区分，尤其是双重效果原则，来为“管理”潜在器官捐赠者的死亡过程以获取可用于移植的活体器官进行辩护。这些传统的道德区分可能是有用的，特别是在决疑法或具体案例的道德分析中，但在此处援引它们并不具有说服力，而且可能是危险的。该协议依靠精心编造的辩词来避免与它所带来的道德挑战进行坦诚的对抗——即社会愿意导致一名患者死亡（单独且可能伴有不适）以便使另一名患者受益。这个协议不仅无法解决它声称要解决的问题，还可能破坏我们区分生与死、允许的“听任死亡”与不允许的杀戮，以及哪些人可以摘除器官与哪些人的身体必须保持不可侵犯之间的微妙社会调适。
