Fronstin P, Copeland C
EBRI Issue Brief. 1997 Sep(189):1-22.
This Issue Brief discusses Medicare reform. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 reduces spending in the Medicare program by $115 billion between 1998 and 2002. Most of the reduction in spending comes from reducing payments to providers, and most of the savings (36 percent) occur in 2002. By 2007, the Part A trust fund is expected to be insolvent, four years before the baby-boom generation reaches the current Medicare eligibility age of 65. Congress is likely to revisit Medicare reform in the near future. A number of reforms received a significant amount of attention during the Medicare reform debate, but were not included in the final legislation. The Senate-passed legislation would have increased the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67, imposed means testing on Medicare Part B, and imposed a Part B home health copayment of $5. While these provisions were not included in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, they may be the focal point of future Medicare reform. Many changes to the Medicare program are likely to significantly affect employment-based health plans for both active and retired workers. Raising the Medicare eligibility age would undoubtedly affect both workers and retirees. Unless workers are willing to work until age 67, their likelihood of becoming uninsured would increase. In 1995, 15.8 percent of retirees ages 55-64 were uninsured, compared with 11.5 percent of workers in the same age group. Early retirees might also find themselves unable to afford health insurance in the private market. An Employee Benefit Research Institute/Gallup poll indicates a direct link between the availability of retiree health benefits and a worker's decision to retire early. In 1993, 61 percent of workers reported that they would not retire before becoming eligible for Medicare if their employer did not provide retiree health benefits. If workers responded to an increase in the retirement age by working longer, employment-based health plans would probably experience an increase in costs, because older workers are the most costly to cover. Some employers might respond to an increase in the Medicare eligibility age by dropping coverage altogether. The message for future beneficiaries is becoming very clear: expect less from Medicare at later ages and higher premiums. As was true prior to the enactment of Medicare in 1965, workers will increasingly need to include retiree health insurance as an expected expense as they plan and save for retirement.
本问题简报讨论了医疗保险改革。1997年的《平衡预算法案》在1998年至2002年期间将医疗保险计划的支出削减了1150亿美元。支出的减少大部分来自于降低对医疗服务提供者的支付,且大部分节省(36%)发生在2002年。到2007年,预计A部分信托基金将资不抵债,这比婴儿潮一代达到目前医疗保险资格年龄65岁要早四年。国会很可能在不久的将来重新审视医疗保险改革。在医疗保险改革辩论期间,一些改革受到了大量关注,但未被纳入最终立法。参议院通过的立法原本会将医疗保险资格年龄从65岁提高到67岁,对医疗保险B部分实施收入调查,并对B部分的家庭健康护理收取5美元的共付费用。虽然这些条款未被纳入1997年的《平衡预算法案》,但它们可能成为未来医疗保险改革的焦点。医疗保险计划的许多变化可能会对在职和退休工人基于就业的健康计划产生重大影响。提高医疗保险资格年龄无疑会影响工人和退休人员。除非工人愿意工作到67岁,否则他们未参保的可能性会增加。1995年,55至64岁的退休人员中有15.8%未参保,而同年龄组的工人中这一比例为11.5%。提前退休人员可能还会发现自己在私人市场上买不起医疗保险。员工福利研究协会/盖洛普民意调查表明,退休人员健康福利的可获得性与工人提前退休的决定之间存在直接联系。1993年,61%的工人表示,如果雇主不提供退休人员健康福利,他们不会在符合医疗保险资格之前退休。如果工人因退休年龄提高而工作更长时间,则基于就业的健康计划的成本可能会增加,因为年龄较大的工人的保险成本最高。一些雇主可能会通过完全取消保险来应对医疗保险资格年龄的提高。给未来受益人的信息变得非常明确:晚年从医疗保险中得到的会更少,保费会更高。正如1965年医疗保险法案颁布之前的情况一样,工人在为退休做计划和储蓄时,将越来越需要把退休人员健康保险作为一项预期支出纳入其中。