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激励措施对管理式医疗中指定服务使用情况的影响。

Effect of incentives on the use of indicated services in managed care.

作者信息

Pantilat S Z, Chesney M, Lo B

机构信息

Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, USA.

出版信息

West J Med. 1999 Mar;170(3):137-42.

Abstract

In managed care, financial incentives and utilization review create conflicts of interest for physicians. We sought to determine whether these incentives would lead physicians to deny indicated services. We surveyed internists practicing in areas with at least 30% penetration of managed care. Our questionnaire included four scenarios in which a test or referral is indicated according to clearly established practice guidelines. We randomly assigned physicians to receive one of five versions of the questionnaire, which differed only in the type of reimbursement incentive and utilization review that applied to the scenarios. We received responses from 710 (70%) of 1,009 internists. Although physicians underutilized services regardless of incentives in all scenarios, physicians whose questionnaires depicted full capitation said that they would order fewer services than physicians whose questionnaires depicted fee-for-service. In the scenario in which an x-ray of the lumbosacral spine is indicated for a patient with low back pain, 86% of physicians randomized to the full capitation version said that they would order the test compared to 94% in the fee-for-service version. Similarly, physicians randomized to scenarios requiring utilization review said that they would order fewer services than those randomized to scenarios requiring completion of an insurance form. Scenarios depicting managed care incentives caused consistent, modest underutilization compared to fee-for-service scenarioes, although physicians underutilized services under all financial incentives and utilization review. In response, physicians must develop better methods for detecting underutilization and devise programs to increase the provision of indicated services.

摘要

在管理式医疗中,经济激励措施和利用审查会给医生带来利益冲突。我们试图确定这些激励措施是否会导致医生拒绝提供指定的服务。我们对在管理式医疗渗透率至少达到30%的地区执业的内科医生进行了调查。我们的问卷包含四种情景,在这些情景中,根据明确确立的实践指南需要进行一项检查或转诊。我们随机分配医生接受问卷的五个版本之一,这些版本仅在适用于情景的报销激励类型和利用审查方面有所不同。我们收到了1009名内科医生中710名(70%)的回复。尽管在所有情景中,无论有无激励措施,医生都未充分利用服务,但问卷描述为全额按人头付费的医生表示,他们会比问卷描述为按服务收费的医生开出更少的服务单。在为一名腰痛患者进行腰骶部脊柱X光检查的情景中,被随机分配到全额按人头付费版本的医生中有86%表示他们会开出这项检查单,而在按服务收费版本中这一比例为94%。同样,被随机分配到需要进行利用审查情景的医生表示,他们会比被随机分配到需要填写保险表格情景的医生开出更少的服务单。与按服务收费的情景相比,描述管理式医疗激励措施的情景导致了持续且适度的服务利用不足,尽管在所有经济激励措施和利用审查下医生都存在服务利用不足的情况。作为回应,医生必须开发更好的方法来检测服务利用不足,并设计项目以增加指定服务的提供。

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