Stone D A
Public Policy. 1979 Spring;27(2):227-54.
Illness or disability is often used as an eligibility criterion by public programs that distribute money, services, privileges, and exemptions. Physicians then play a central role in the allocation process. But physicians are caught between a large pool of applicants who want some benefit, on the one hand, and an organization with limited resources to distribute, on the other hand. Three conflicts are engendered in this gatekeeping role: the tension between trusting and mistrusting information provided by the patient, the tension between erring on the false positive side and the false negative side in diagnostic decision-making, and the tension between doing everything possible for each patient and allocating limited resources among several needy clients. Several non-medical factors influence the ultimate outcome of this allocation process, which, in theory, rests on clinical decision-making: the specificity and restrictiveness of the formal definitions of illness and disability used by a program; the structure of the determination process; the overall policy of the organization on distribution of benefits; and the ability of the organization to use administrative review, direct incentives, and written standards to control the certifying behavior of physicians.
疾病或残疾常常被公共项目用作分配资金、服务、特权和豁免的资格标准。医生在这一分配过程中起着核心作用。但医生一方面夹在大量希望获得某种福利的申请者中间,另一方面又处于一个资源有限的分配机构之间。在这个把关角色中产生了三种冲突:对患者提供的信息是信任还是不信任之间的紧张关系,诊断决策中出现假阳性和假阴性错误之间的紧张关系,以及为每个患者竭尽全力与在几个有需求的客户之间分配有限资源之间的紧张关系。几个非医学因素会影响这一分配过程的最终结果,从理论上讲,这一结果取决于临床决策:一个项目所使用的疾病和残疾的正式定义的具体性和限制性;判定过程的结构;该机构关于福利分配的总体政策;以及该机构利用行政审查、直接激励措施和书面标准来控制医生认证行为的能力。