Stanovich K E, West R F
Department of Human Development and Applied Psychology, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Canada.
Cogn Psychol. 1999 May;38(3):349-85. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1998.0700.
Several tasks from the heuristics and biases literature were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that the deeper the understanding of a normative principle, the greater the tendency to respond in accord with it. The principle was instantiated both correlationally and experimentally. An individual differences version was used to examine whether individuals higher in tendencies toward reflective thought and in cognitive ability would be more likely to behave normatively. In a second application of the understanding/acceptance principle, subjects were presented with arguments both for and against normative choices and it was observed whether, on a readministration of the task, performance was more likely to move in a normative direction. Several discrepancies between performance and normative models could be explained by the understanding/acceptance principle. However, several gaps between descriptive and normative models (particularly those deriving from some noncausal base rate problems) were not clarified by the understanding/acceptance principle-they could not be explained in terms of varying task understanding or tendencies toward reflective thought. The results demonstrate how the variation and instability in responses can be analyzed to yield inferences about why descriptive and normative models of human reasoning and decision making sometimes do not coincide.
根据斯洛维奇和特沃斯基（1974）的理解/接受原则，即对规范原则的理解越深，就越倾向于按照该原则做出反应，对启发式和偏差文献中的几个任务进行了研究。该原则通过相关性和实验性进行了实例化。使用个体差异版本来检验在反思性思维倾向和认知能力方面较高的个体是否更有可能做出规范性行为。在理解/接受原则的第二次应用中，向受试者展示了支持和反对规范性选择的论据，并观察在重新进行任务时，表现是否更有可能朝着规范性方向发展。表现与规范模型之间的几个差异可以通过理解/接受原则来解释。然而，描述性模型和规范模型之间存在的几个差距（特别是那些源于一些非因果性基础概率问题的差距）并没有通过理解/接受原则得到澄清——无法根据对任务理解的不同或反思性思维倾向来解释这些差距。结果表明，如何通过分析反应中的变化和不稳定性来推断人类推理和决策的描述性模型与规范性模型有时为何不一致。
