Fulford K W
University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
J Abnorm Psychol. 1999 Aug;108(3):412-20. doi: 10.1037//0021-843x.108.3.412.
Nine variations on the theme of J. C. Wakefield's (1999) evolutionary definition of dysfunction show that the concept is not, as he claims, purely causal. It depends also on a teleological element of meaning introduced, in Wakefield's formulation, through an equivocation on the sense in which natural selection explains biological forms. The corollary (presented here briefly as a coda to the theme and variations) is that Wakefield's definition is not, as he also claims, value free. However, contra S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995), this does not place diagnostic judgments of dysfunction outside the scope of science.
围绕J. C. 韦克菲尔德（1999）对功能障碍的进化论定义展开的九种变体表明，该概念并不像他所宣称的那样纯粹是因果性的。在韦克菲尔德的表述中，它还依赖于一种意义上的目的论元素，这种元素是通过对自然选择解释生物形式的意义的模棱两可引入的。其推论（在此作为主题及变体的尾声简要呈现）是，韦克菲尔德的定义也并不像他所宣称的那样价值中立。然而，与S. O. 利连菲尔德和L. 马里诺（1995）的观点相反，这并不会使对功能障碍的诊断判断超出科学的范畴。
