Beauchamp G
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, St-Hyacinthe, Québec, J2S 7C6, Canada.
J Theor Biol. 2000 Nov 7;207(1):21-35. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2153.
In population games, the optimal behaviour of a forager depends partly on courses of action selected by other individuals in the population. How individuals learn to allocate effort in foraging games involving frequency-dependent payoffs has been little examined. The performance of three different learning rules was investigated in several types of habitats in each of two population games. Learning rules allow individuals to weigh information about the past and the present and to choose among alternative patterns of behaviour. In the producer-scrounger game, foragers use producer to locate food patches and scrounger to exploit the food discoveries of others. In the ideal free distribution game, foragers that experience feeding interference from companions distribute themselves among heterogeneous food patches. In simulations of each population game, the use of different learning rules induced large variation in foraging behaviour, thus providing a tool to assess the relevance of each learning rule in experimental systems. Rare mutants using alternative learning rules often successfully invaded populations of foragers using other rules indicating that some learning rules are not stable when pitted against each other. Learning rules often closely approximated optimal behaviour in each population game suggesting that stimulus-response learning of contingencies created by foraging companions could be sufficient to perform at near-optimal level in two population games.
在群体博弈中,觅食者的最优行为部分取决于群体中其他个体所选择的行动方案。在涉及频率依赖收益的觅食博弈中,个体如何学习分配努力程度,这方面的研究很少。在两个群体博弈中的每一个博弈里,研究了几种不同栖息地类型下三种不同学习规则的表现。学习规则使个体能够权衡过去和当前的信息,并在不同的行为模式中做出选择。在生产者 - 偷窃者博弈中,觅食者利用生产者来定位食物斑块,利用偷窃者来利用其他个体发现的食物。在理想自由分布博弈中,受到同伴觅食干扰的觅食者会在不同的食物斑块间进行自我分配。在每个群体博弈的模拟中,使用不同的学习规则会导致觅食行为产生很大差异,从而提供了一种工具来评估每个学习规则在实验系统中的相关性。使用替代学习规则的罕见突变体常常成功入侵使用其他规则的觅食者群体,这表明一些学习规则相互竞争时并不稳定。学习规则在每个群体博弈中常常非常接近最优行为,这表明由觅食同伴创造的应急情况的刺激 - 反应学习可能足以在两个群体博弈中达到接近最优的水平。