Schäfer M
Klinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Klinikum der Philipps-Universität, Marburg, Germany.
Med Health Care Philos. 1999;2(3):265-74. doi: 10.1023/a:1009973828786.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the epistemic position of psychiatry between the science of general laws in relation to frequently encountered generality and the science of specific events which is directed towards the particular. In this respect the development of the dichotomy of nomothetic and idiographic methodology from its generally forgotten neo-Kantian origins (Windelband, Rickert, Natorp, Bauch, Münch, Hessen, Münsterberg) is delineated within the context of a historical-philosophical analysis and then its incorporation into psychology and psychopathology (Stern, Binswanger, Kronfeld, Jaspers) is reconstructed. In the course of this analysis and also in the discussion of the currently accepted theories of analytical philosophy (Stegmüller) and critical rationalism (Popper) it becomes clear that, in spite of widespread current opinions to the contrary, individualizing concept formation is an indispensable element in the methodological inventory of psychiatric science.
本文的目的是展示精神病学在关于常见普遍性的一般规律科学与针对特定情况的具体事件科学之间的认知地位。在这方面,从其普遍被遗忘的新康德主义起源(文德尔班、李凯尔特、纳托普、鲍赫、明希、黑森、明斯特伯格)发展而来的规范法与个案法二分法,在历史哲学分析的背景下得以勾勒,随后其融入心理学和精神病理学(施特恩、宾斯万格、克伦菲尔德、雅斯贝尔斯)的过程也得到了重构。在这一分析过程中,以及在对当前被接受的分析哲学理论(施泰格米勒)和批判理性主义(波普尔)的讨论中,很明显,尽管当前普遍存在相反的观点,但个体化概念形成是精神病学科学方法论清单中不可或缺的要素。