对尸体器官捐赠经济激励措施的实证分析

A positive analysis of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donation.

作者信息

Byrne M M, Thompson P

机构信息

VA Medical Center (152), Research Bldg 110T, 2002 Holcombe Boulevard, Houston, TX 77030, USA.

出版信息

J Health Econ. 2001 Jan;20(1):69-83. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(00)00065-5.

DOI:10.1016/s0167-6296(00)00065-5

PMID:11148872

Abstract

Financial incentives of various kinds have been suggested to alleviate the chronic shortage of transplantable organs in the United States. This paper analyzes the possible consequences of financial incentives on organ supply. We show that under current practice and current law (which are not the same), inducements to donate organs or to register as an organ donor may lead to a decline in the supply of organs. Furthermore, some financial incentives that have been proposed lead to time inconsistent choices.

摘要

为缓解美国可移植器官长期短缺的问题，人们提出了各种各样的经济激励措施。本文分析了经济激励措施对器官供应可能产生的后果。我们发现，在当前的做法和现行法律（两者并不相同）下，鼓励捐赠器官或登记成为器官捐赠者可能会导致器官供应减少。此外，一些已被提出的经济激励措施会导致时间不一致的选择。