Crowther-Heyck H
Department of History and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA.
Hist Psychol. 2000 Feb;3(1):67-70. doi: 10.1037/1093-4510.3.1.67.
In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.
在《乔治·A·米勒、语言与心灵的计算机隐喻》(见注释1)一文中,我试图解释米勒如何以及为何赋予心灵的计算机隐喻如此强烈的革命性、反行为主义含义。作为回应,克里斯托弗·格林(见注释2)认为,这个问题的答案与心理表征的重要性有关,心理表征对认知主义者来说是一个重要问题。对此,我认为,虽然心理表征对认知主义者来说是一个重要问题,但还有其他几个同等重要或更重要的因素:具体来说,米勒及其同伴对语言和交流的痴迷,他们对行为主义者学科视野狭隘的不满,以及他们参与了与主流行为主义者不同的实验项目。