Zagorin P
Br J Hist Sci. 2001 Dec;34(123 Pt 4):379-93. doi: 10.1017/s0007087401004411.
This paper examines the concept of objectivity traceable in Francis Bacon's natural philosophy. After some historical background on this concept, it considers the question of whether it is not an anachronism to attribute such a concept to Bacon, since the word 'objectivity' is a later coinage and does not appear anywhere in his writings. The essay gives reasons for answering this question in the negative, and then criticizes the accounts given of Bacon's understanding of objectivity by Lorraine Daston and Julie Robin Solomon. It argues that this understanding is most directly and fully expressed in his discussion of the idols of the mind. In this connection, the paper notes Bacon's critical attitude to sixteenth-century scepticism and its relevance to the idea of objectivity implicit in his comments on the idols. In conclusion, the paper argues that Bacon was not a pure empiricist and describes the place assigned to theories and hypotheses in his natural philosophy.
本文考察了弗朗西斯·培根自然哲学中可追溯的客观性概念。在介绍了这一概念的一些历史背景之后,文章思考了将这样一个概念归于培根是否属于时代错误的问题,因为“客观性”这个词是后来才创造出来的,在他的著作中 nowhere 都未出现。本文给出了否定回答的理由,然后批评了洛林·达斯顿和朱莉·罗宾·所罗门对培根客观性理解的阐述。文章认为,这种理解在他对心智假象的讨论中得到了最直接和充分的表达。在这方面,本文指出了培根对16世纪怀疑主义的批判态度及其与他对假象评论中隐含的客观性观念的相关性。总之,本文认为培根不是一个纯粹的经验主义者,并描述了理论和假设在他的自然哲学中所占据的位置。 (注:原文中“nowhere”疑有误,可能影响对整体文意的准确理解)